#### 1AC: Economic decline causes protectionism and war – their defense doesn’t assume accompanying shifts in global power.

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

-miscalc likely

-defense is unfounded optimism

-trade not resilient when crisis strikes – makes impact D unlikely

-Diversionary theory increases conflict likelihood

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### 1NC: Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Zakaria Editor Newsweek ‘9

(Fareed-, Dec. 12, Newsweek, “The Secrets of Stability”, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/1; Jacob)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today. Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West. The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability. Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system. Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world. This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

#### Resource Wars - Economic growth inevitably causes resource wars

Trainer 2 (Ted, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the School of Social Work, University of New South Wales, July, [ssis.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/D62IfYouWantAffluence.html] AD: 6-22-11, jam)

As is the case with the other major problems confronting the planet, such as environmental destruction, **it is essential to understand** the problem of global **peace** **and conflict from the "limits to growth" perspective**. This analysis focuses on the fact that the **present living standards** of the rich countries **involve levels of production and consumption that are** grossly **unsustainable**. Just to note two of the lines of argument documented in the large literature from the limits perspective, **if all 9 billion people likely to live on earth by 2070 were to have the present** rich world **lifestyle** and "footprint" **we would need about 12 times the area of productive land that exists on the entire planet**. Secondly **if we were to cut greenhouse gas emissions** sufficiently to prevent the carbon content of the atmosphere **from increasing** any more world per capita energy **consumption would have to be cut** to **about one-eighteenth** of its present amount If all 9 billion people likely by 2070 were to have the present rich world per capita resource consumption, **resource production would have to be about 8 times the present rate**. **These multiples underline the magnitude of the overshoot**. Sustainability will require enormous reductions in the volume of rich world production and consumption. Yet **its supreme goal is economic growth**, i.e., to increase the levels of production and consumption and GDP, constantly, rapidly and **without** any **limit**. **That** the **absurdity** of this **is never recognised** in conventional economic and political circles defies understanding. If we in rich countries average 3% economic growth to 2070 and by then all the world’s people had risen to the "living standards’ we would have by then, the total world economic output would be 60 times as great as the present grossly unsustainable level. If this limits to growth analysis is at all valid the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, **in a world where resources are** already **scarce**, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we the rich are determined to get richer without any limit, then **nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict** and violence. To put it another way, **if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed.**

#### No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

#### 2AC: No ev

#### 2NC: No resource wars from crisis – best studies

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ’11 (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

#### War more likely from growth than decline – psychological and resource factors

Mauer 86, (Nathan, economist The Kondratieif Waves, p 197-8)

The overall trend of the economy shapes perceptions as to its strength and direction. In a hull market, "experts" are almost uniformly optimistic; in a bear market the owlish analysts almost universally suggest caution. **It is during the upward swings**, soon after a trough and just before a peak, **that wars become more likely**. It should be noted that **peak wars are the result of a different kind of socioeconomic psychological pressure and have quite different economic results than trough wars**. **Nations become socially and politically unsettled after** a long period of boom and **expansion**, perhaps **because** in their final stages, peoples' **expectations begin to outrun actual growth** in the general level of prosperity. **War then becomes the ultimate destination**. **Inasmuch as all nations arc attempting to expand simultaneously, the intense competition for resources and markets leads eventually to military confrontations, which become contagious**. One explanation suggested is that **during trough wars the public is still largely concerned with** private considerations and **their own wellbeing**. **They tend to be less interested in international disputes, world crusades, or campaigns involving large investment of cash, effort, and the nervous energy needed to pursue projects to a conclusio**n. **Trough wars tend to be short. They are more a matter of choice and sudden decision by the stronger power**. **Inasmuch as peak wars are the result of frustration of expectations** {usually with economic elements), **peak wars tend to be more desperate, more widespread, and more destructive.**

### Notes

“Constructives: make arguments

Rebuttals: Repeat arguments

This is wrong. A debate should look like this

Constructives: Make arguments

Rebuttals: Resolve arguments

At its most basic form argument resolution evaluates two competing claims (the one presented by your team and the one presented by the opposing team) and then gives the judge a rationale for why your argument is better. This is what argument repetition looks like”

**INSERT EXAMPLE FROM THE PRACTICE DEBATE**

A:

N:

A:

N:

“In this debate we have a claim presented by each side, the job of a rebuttal is to resolve these claims for the judge. You basically want to think about what you would like the judge to say in their RFD and make arguments that support that. So you want them to say “the neg won no impact to the economy because …”‑ fill in “the because” and you are starting to resolve things. In most debates argument resolution doesn’t need to be super high level, the sheer fact that you are making an effort will quickly differentiate you from the other team.”

#### HOW TO DO?

“A. Evidence quality‑ prefer our evidence because it postdates is an example of argument resolution, so is arguing qualifications

B. Logic/Spin‑ this is basically where you make your own argument about why your side should win, something like “Economic decline may statistically correlate with conflict, but that doesn’t mean every decline causes war, lack of war after 08 proves this‑ the only example the aff can give is WW 2 which means 1 out of 100 economic collapses cause war”

C. Impact comparison‑ Take the statement above‑ if you were to relate that to impact calculus it would be a probability argument. To make this resolution you now need to COMPARE it to the impact you are going for and explain why your impact is more probable.”

Let’s take the example of Economic decline with the Royal 10 evidence

“1NC: Economic decline doesn’t cause war‑ 08 financial collapse emp denies their impact‑ it was the largest dip since the great depression and it didn’t produce great power war

2NR: Extend economic decline doesn’t cause war‑ they’ve conceded the 08 collapse was massive and didn’t cause war‑ this means their advantage won’t cause war either”

You’ll notice that if your justifications are the same form the 1st speech to the last, something wrong is happening.

“What should you be doing instead? You should be picking a small number of warrants for each point, blowing them up, and then resolving them. This is somewhat complicated so I am going to try and break it down with a few very small examples. Let’s start with growth. Let’s say the debate has developed like this”

(ILLUSTRATE VIA WHITEBOARD, EXPLAIN WHAT EACH OF THESE INDEPENDENTLY MEAN, USE CARDS TO ILLUSTRATE)

1AC: Economic decline causes war‑ statistics prove

1NC: Economic decline does not cause war‑ leaders turn inward, Growth causes war – k2 fund military budgets

2AC: Extend statistics, also diversionary theory, and empirics WW 2, US proves economic decline doesn’t cause budget cuts‑ people always prioritize security

Ok already we are getting pretty full and we aren’t even to the 2NC. This is more than enough material for a very in depth rebuttal. Nevertheless, lets press on

2NC

Economic decline doesn’t cause war

‑extend budget cuts

‑popular opinion turns against war when people are hungry (new)

‑lack of economic growth stops resource conflicts (new)

‑diversionary theory is wrong

‑Empirics go neg‑ WW 2 occurred 10 years after the depression, multiple past collapses didn’t cause war

Economic Growth Causes War

‑extend growth fills coffers for conflict

‑growth fuels resource conflicts

‑interdependence prompts war (new)

‑Growth fuels public support for engagement/hegemony which causes conflict escalation (new)

That’s getting pretty big. This is where most people run into 1AR trouble‑ they try and repeat everything the 2AC said, this forces them to make shallow/poorly explained arguments and oftentimes they still drop things. Given that just this part of the debate will take quite a chunk of time and there is still lots more going on you have to make choices and focus on argument resolution. So if I was giving this 1AR I would want to try and collapse some parts of the debate and focus on others. Diversionary war is an ok argument, but the neg just presented defense so its one you can kick out of. The neg made multiple points about resource conflicts so that one you probably want to spend more time on etc. Argument resolution in a 1AR doesn’t need to be as in depth as a final rebuttal but you still want it to happen. Here are some examples

27.5

“extend growth causes war‑ diversionary theory and statistics prove. Free markets solve resource wars through price signals”

Didn’t address many of the arguments, didn’t really explain the arguments it did make… still better than many 1ARs

28

“Group war‑ evaluate this debate through the lenz of empirics‑ major conflicts often follow economic decline, but no major periods of peace do. Empirical arguments are descriptive whereas negative evidence is purely normative‑ it describes how things could happen but it is usually wrong”

Now both forwarding empirics as a lens and the normative/descriptive distinction are good arguments‑ but here they aren’t really explained or flushed out fully. In addition the rest of the debate is largely glossed over‑ yes there is an argument for why something comes before the rest, but since that is poorly explained it would be dangerous to stake the debate on that distinction.

28.5

“Empirics come first‑ they are the best guide to future action. Royal does a comprehensive statistical analysis and shows growth is correlated with peace over the long haul‑ even if not every decline causes war its more likely than not. Prefer this evidence‑ their cards are theoretical but proven wrong by history‑ they can’t name a time great powers cut defense budgets in response to economic collapse, if anything stim programs ramp up government spending to jump start the economy. Even if some of their arguments are true the overall statistical trend still goes affirmative”

Again, doesn’t address every line by line argument but does do a much better job of explaining why winning a few key arguments should resolve the other arguments in the affirmatives favor. To make this better (29 and above) you would want to try and add more: comparisons (evidence and warrant), and address specific negative arguments you think may NOT be addressed purely by statistics.

Many people have trouble filling time in rebuttals, especially when the debate comes down to a few small issues. If this describes you than I’m guessing a big part of the problem is lack of argument resolution. If you don’t have enough “tools” to work with for resolving arguments in the rebuttal it’s probably a sign that your constructives weren’t put together very well and lacked diversity.

By the time the 2NR/2AR rolls around you want to be focusing roughly 60% of your time on argument resolution, and that’s true regardless of what sheet (k, DA, case) or what argument (no link, link turn, impact defense) . If you find you don’t have time for this then one of the following has happened ‑constructives weren’t effective ‑you aren’t picking and choosing enough ‑you need to work on efficiency/speed So how do you get better/practice argument resolution? The easiest way is to use old rebuttalseither from debates you were in or debates you watched. If you don’t have flows then you just need to construct your own mini debate. This is really easy to do yourself or with a partner. All you need to do is come up with some arguments ( cards even if you want) and assign them to each side. You can do it on any issue (winners win or reasonability) and for any argument (case on zero day or framework on Baudrillard).

Here is an example

Terrorism causes Extinction

‑WMD

‑Retaliation

Terrorism doesn’t cause extinction

‑no motive

‑no technical capacity

‑no support for retaliation”

“This is pretty simple‑ you can make up multiple warrants for each point for either side. Examples can get increasingly complex from there. Depending on your own individual skill you want to pick an example that is applicable and work your way up. If you are inexperienced you don’t want to start trying to give a 30 level speech on an example where each side has 40 points‑ you’d want to start smaller and small chunk your way up.”